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ABSTRACT 
The home has been lifted to a special pantheon of rights and 
protections in American constitutional law. Until recently, a conception 
of special protections for the home in the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause was under-addressed by scholars. However, a contemporary and 
robust academic treatment of a home-centric takings doctrine merits a 
different approach to construction and interpretation: the intratextual 
and intradoctrinal implications of a coherent set of homebound 
protections across the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause. 
Intratextualism and intradoctrinalism are interpretive methods of 
juxtaposing non-adjoining and adjoining clauses in the Constitution and 
Supreme Court doctrines to find patterns of meaning in words and 
jurisprudence. Applying these methodological exercises to the first five 
amendments in the Bill of Rights reveals deeper thematic connections 
among the textual and doctrinal protections to the home. This cross-
pollination of constitutional clauses and doctrines also offers scholars 
and jurists normative doctrines to provide greater protections to homes 
beyond the traditional protections that have existed for decades under 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law scholars and jurists frequently engage in textual 
and doctrinal methods of constitutional construction. This is well 
recognized in constitutional law literature, but scholars have paid little 
attention to or engaged in these methods of interpretation with regard 
to the “constitutional home.”1 A textual and doctrinal thread of 
homebound protections runs through the first five amendments, 
delineating the home as a place worthy of special constitutional 
protections. However, there is a distinct chasm. The Bill of Rights 
extends special protections to homes in rights that cover smut, guns, 
soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination, but those same protections do 
not extend to takings.2 
In recent scholarship, I argued that the story behind the absence of 
a special protection to homes in the Takings Clause is partly due to the 
Supreme Court’s adherence, particularly in its public use doctrine, to 
 
 1. See generally Gerald S. Dickinson, The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home, 80 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1099 (2020). 
 2. Id. at 1100. 
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deferential standards in substantive economic due process. But the 
Court has applied strict scrutiny standards for fundamental rights, 
including privacy rights that involve the home as a zone of protection.3 
However, this explanation is unpersuasive as to why the Supreme 
Court should, normatively, extend the homebound protections to its 
takings doctrine. Thus, the absence of a homebound takings doctrine 
calls for an application of coherence theory to carve out a special 
protection doctrine for the home under the Takings Clause.4 All else 
being equal, scholars and the Supreme Court could, and arguably 
should, as a matter of coherence theory, extend the home-centric 
doctrinal thread of special protections to cover homes in takings.5 This 
Article advances this thesis by engaging in intratextual and 
intradoctrinal methods of constitutional interpretation to cross-
pollinate various homebound protections across the Bill of Rights. 
Akhil Amar has noted that protections to the home under the 
Constitution were largely a result of the post-Reconstruction era, 
where the Third Amendment bridged a “home-centric Second 
Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from the beginning 
protective of the private domain.”6 Indeed, an intratextual and 
intradoctrinal approach to homebound protections within the Bill of 
Rights—“done correctly”—provides scholars and jurists a deeper 
appreciation of and understanding for protections of the “home” than 
analyzing the Court’s analysis of each amendment separately.7 This 
methodological exercise reveals intriguing patterns of related 
protections between different homebound protections in the Bill of 
Rights, while at the same time exposing deeper thematic associations 
of protections to the home within the Bill of Rights and normative 
arguments for expanding protections to the home. 
I. INTERPRETIVE METHODS TO THE DOCUMENT AND DOCTRINE 
Textualism and doctrinalism have long competed for the laurel as 
the superior method of constitutional interpretation.8 While textualism 
 
 3. Id. at 1104. 
 4. Id. at 1103. 
 5. Id. 
 6. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 267 (1998). 
 7. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with 
“Intratextualism”, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 771 (2000). 
 8. See generally PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982) (proposing six modalities of interpretation, including historical, textual, 
doctrinal, prudential, structural and ethical). Although the traditional interpretive methods 
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is resurgent in constitutional and statutory interpretation,9 doctrinalism 
still maintains a foothold as the predominant method of 
interpretation.10 Intratextualism may provide a more coherent and 
harmonized conception of the sanctity of the home across the Bill of 
Rights.11 However, a more holistic examination of the Bill of Rights 
offers greater clarity and coherence to the Court’s distinctive 
protection to the home, but also its inexplicable absence of such 
protections in takings. For example, textually relying upon the 
“writtenness” of the home is an incomplete treatment of home-centric 
interpretations across the Bill of Rights. Thus, we would be remiss not 
to engage with doctrinalism—or intradoctrinalism—to resolve the 
dilemma.12 
 
include text, history, structure, prudence, and doctrine, I chose to focus the methodological 
framework on textualism and doctrinalism, as both are primary methods and the former 
encompasses, for the most part, “structural” and “historical” methods that aim to “mine as much 
meaning as possible from the Constitution itself,” or who Akhil Reed Amar refers to as 
“documentarians.” See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 30 (2000) (arguing that these “readings are 
documentarian”).  
 9. See generally Abbe Gluck, The State as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) 
(examining how state courts have experimented with giving stare decisis effect to methodologies 
of statutory interpretation); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. 
L. REV. 157 (2018) (highlighting how textualist U.S. Supreme Court Justices have been willing to 
abandon stare decisis); John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 
(2010); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that 
while textualism has a strong foothold in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court’s approach to 
preemption still tends to fundamentally purposive); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Textualism and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237 (2017) (arguing that textualism has seen a 
resurgence in in statutory interpretation including in interpreting civil rights statutes); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010) (highlighting Philip P. 
Frickey’s work examining the “empirical foundations of early textualism); Jennifer Nou, 
Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81 (2015) (arguing that judges should take a textualist 
approach to regulatory interpretation); John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle 
Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369 (2013) (highlighting the tension between the “new textualism” 
and obstacle preemption); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: 
Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121 (2016) 
(asserting that Supreme Court Justices have used a combination of textualism with pragmatism 
to mold decisions based on ideological preferences); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the 
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011) (documenting the rise 
of “new textualism”, its significance, and work that remains to be done). 
 10. See David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (indicating that “constitutional law resembles the common law much more 
closely than it resembles a text-based system”). 
 11. Vermeule & Young, supra note 7, at 771. See Amar, supra note 8, at 30. It matters little, 
as Ahkil Amar explains, whether we label such interpretive methods “textual,” “structural,” or 
“historical.” These interpretations are, at the end of the day, “documentarian” in that they seek 
meaning directly from the Constitution. Id. 
 12. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV 747, 747–48, 796 (1999) 
[hereinafter Amar’s Intratextualism].  
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A. Intratextualists and Textualism 
Some scholars have argued that the Constitution’s Bill of Rights 
has not been “studied holistically,” and instead has been “broken up 
into discrete blocks of text, with each segment examined in isolation.”13 
One methodological approach is what Amar coins as “intratextualism”; 
that is, using the Constitution as a concordance to identify patterns 
across the first five Bill of Rights.14 This type of concordance 
intratextualism enables and encourages scholars to “place 
nonadjoining clauses alongside each other for analysis because [the 
clauses] use the same (or very similar) words and phrases.”15 This 
approach of interpreting noncontiguous and contiguous amendments 
reveals “deeper thematic connection[s],” and is particularly useful in 
understanding home-centric protections.16 
At its core, intratextualism is a method for understanding the 
meaning of certain words, provisions, and clauses in the Constitution by 
comparing “various words and phrases” that recur throughout the 
document.17 The goal is to find meaning. The interpreter attempts to 
“read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in 
light of another passage . . . featuring the same (or very similar) word 
or phrase.”18 This, Amar argues, is a necessary supplement to the 
traditional constitutional interpretive methods, such as “text, history, 
structure, prudence, and doctrine.”19 In other words, if scholars—and 
jurists especially—parse the “text of a given clause[,]” they can find 
meaning and patterns that lead to conclusions about the intent of the 
Framers or the meaning of a particular provision.20 Intratextualism also 
considers parallel provisions in light of their text, history, and 
precedent, and seeks illumination by comparing the two provisions.21 
An intratextualist approach to the Constitution by interpreters 
requires an eye towards “consistency rather than inconsistency.”22 As 
 
 13. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 78 at XI. 
(1998). This is not an endorsement of Amar’s “intratextualism” per se, but instead simply an 
application of an interpretative methodology that is useful to examine the chasm in homebound 
protections between the Takings Clause and the rest of the Bill of Rights. 
 14. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 792–93.  
 15. Id. at 793.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 747–48. 
 18. Id. at 748. 
 19. Id. at 754. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Vermeule & Young, supra note 7, at 739. 
 22. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 794. 
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many will argue, it is difficult to find “any single, coherent scheme of 
principle”23 under the Constitution, but intratextualism attempts to do 
so. 
Amar’s famous example of intratextualism is his analysis of Justice 
Marshall’s “intriguing methodological turn” in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.24 There, Justice Marshall referenced several provisions in the 
Constitution, effectively using the document itself as a dictionary to 
define “necessary” and “absolutely necessary.” In doing so, Amar 
explains that Justice Marshall concluded that “absolutely necessary” 
was used by the Framers to convey “necessity,” and therefore 
“necessary” under Article I, Section 8 does not implicitly mean the 
same as the strict meaning of “necessity.”25 
Another example is Amar’s parsing of Article V. The provision 
states that Congress is empowered “whenever two thirds of both 
Houses shall deem it necessary”26 to suggest changes to the 
Constitution. Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause states that 
Congress shall “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Executive the foregoing Powers.”27 And then, again, in 
Article II, Section 3, the Constitution gives the President the power to 
recommend to Congress “such Measures as he shall judge necessary 
and expedient.”28 Later in the text, Article IV, Section 3 states that 
Congress has the power to “make all needful rules and regulations 
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United 
States.”29 
Amar’s “intratextualism” views the Constitution as its own 
dictionary, and holds that similar words could and should be 
interpreted the same way. If the reader (or judge) is unsure of the 
meaning behind “necessary” or “proper,” then she could pull out the 
internal dictionary that is the Constitution, scan its pages to find the 
same word, and then interpret that same word the same way as (or 
differently than) it has been interpreted by other judges in similar (or 
not so similar) factual and legal circumstances.30 If intratextualism is 
 
 23. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 217, 229 (1986). 
 24. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see also Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 
12, at 756. 
 25. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 757. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 788. 
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done “modestly,” such a method may have benefits that outweigh the 
burdens or liabilities.31 
Yet, the text of the Constitution “routinely . . . has very little to do 
with the way the case is argued or decided,” and instead “resembles the 
common law much more closely than it resembles a text-based 
system.”32 The Court’s opinions are atextual in nature and more 
reminiscent of “purposivist and precedent-based interpretive 
methodologies.”33 But “intratextualism often merely provides an 
interpretive lead or clue” that cannot be fully understood until scholars 
and jurists employ additional interpretive tools.”34 
B. Doctrinalists and Doctrinalism 
This Article leans simultaneously on both “documentarians”35 and 
“doctrinalists” to study how a homebound “takings” doctrine—as 
explored in prior scholarship36—might inform normative protections to 
homes in other adjacent and nonadjacent amendments across the Bill 
of Rights.37 While documentarians look to the “specific words and word 
patterns, [and] the historical experiences that birthed and rebirthed the 
text,”38 doctrinalists do not rely strictly upon the text, history, and 
structure of the Constitution. Rather, they “strive to synthesize what 
the Supreme Court has said and done, sometimes rather loosely, in the 
name of the Constitution.”39 An interpreter who utilizes doctrinalism 
 
 31. Id. at 738. 
 32. Strauss, supra note 10, at 4. 
 33. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1241 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709 (1975)); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 921 (1996) (noting how the Establishment 
Clause and Warrant Clause have been interpreted in purposivist ways that are at odds with the 
original understanding of the text). 
 34. Amar’s Intratextualism, supra note 12, at 771.  
 35. Examples of such interpreters include Justice Hugo Black, Dean John Hart Ely, and 
Professors Steven Calabresi and Douglas Laycock. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 26. 
 36. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1099. 
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. AMAR, supra note 6, at 26. 
 39. Id. Notable doctrinalists include Justice Harlan, Dean Kathleen Sullivan, Professor 
Richard Fallon and Professor David Strauss. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 26; see also Bruce 
Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5 
(1991) (arguing that Harlan sought to “revitalize common law constitutionalism”); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 54 (1997) (assessing the content, role, and process of Supreme Court doctrine); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE. L.J. 1119 (1995) (arguing that Supreme 
Court doctrine is fundamentally based on understandings of democracy); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term–Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22 (1992) (highlighting the surprisingly moderate nature of the 1991 term shedding light on 
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replaces the enacted text with “elaborate precedent.”40 Those who 
“privilege precedent concede that the text does sometimes matter.”41 
But, by utilizing doctrinalism alongside intratextualism, one might 
argue that “[j]udicial doctrines, working alongside [other] rules . . . 
properly fill in the document’s outline, making broad principles 
workably specific in a court and in the world.”42 This approach 
acknowledges that the document requires the “crafting of doctrine by 
courts.”43 Likewise, interpreting the Constitution is similar to the Court 
utilizing common law doctrinal principles to flesh out meaning.44 
With the methodological framework of this Article laid out, let us 
proceed to revisit the Court’s homebound doctrines that involve smut, 
guns, soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination using intratextualism 
and intradoctrinalism as interpretive tools.45 I will then proceed to 
identify and discuss the lack of protections to the home under the 
Takings Clause, and then advocate for a homebound limitation in 
takings as a matter of harmony and consistency.46 
II. THE HOMEBOUND BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Constitution and the Supreme Court have created a textual 
and doctrinal schism within the Bill of Rights that, until recently, was 
left unaddressed.47 Over decades, the Court has granted special 
protections to a zone of privacy within the home but has failed to 
extend similar protections to the home in its takings doctrine.48 
Take, for example, the First Amendment. In Stanley v. Georgia, the 
Court noted that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means 
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, 
what books he may read or what films he may watch.”49 This is an 
 
the connection between rules and standards); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (vigorously defending the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions). 
 40. AMAR, supra note 6, at 27. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 79. 
 43. Fallon, supra note 39, at 57. 
 44. See Strauss, supra note 33, at 877–79 (arguing that textualism and originalism are 
inadequate models for constitutional law, but rather the common-law approach “restrains judges 
more effectively”). 
 45. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1099. 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. See Dickinson, supra note 1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); see also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 
142 (1973) (“The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it 
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atextual treatment of the homebound protections—a precise and 
express protection to the home is not evident in the text of the First 
Amendment. 
Likewise, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court found a 
constitutionally-protected individual right to bear arms in the “hearth 
and home.”50 This atextual reading of the Second Amendment left 
many wondering the value and import of structure and textual 
interpretations of the Second Amendment.51 Yet, adjoining the Second 
Amendment is the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering 
soldiers in the home during peacetime. This rarely studied amendment 
has raised significant questions regarding its utility and original intent. 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court gave credence to 
the Third Amendment’s textual prohibition of quartering soldiers in a 
home during peace time, noting that “in many parts of the world, a 
military commander can seize private housing to shelter his troops. Not 
so, however, in the United States.”52 
Similarly, the adjacent Fourth Amendment textually protects the 
home, giving “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses    
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.53 The Court has noted 
that “the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”54 Even in the criminal 
procedure clause of the Fifth Amendment there exists an atextual 
protection of the home. The Court has peered across the Bill of Rights 
to the Fourth Amendment to find a homebound protection in 
compulsory exhortation of a person’s testimony when the home is 
unlawfully entered and searched by law enforcement.55 The Court has 
 
protects other special privacy rights.”); Moreno v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 
314 (D.D.C. 1972) (“Recent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that even the states, which 
possess a great police power not granted to Congress, cannot in the name of morality infringe the 
rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home.”). 
 50. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 615–16, 635 (2008) (explaining that the 
founding generation supported “every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them in his 
house, his castle, for his own defense”). 
 51. See id. at 720 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the basis for finding the use of arms 
for self-defense purposes as the core of the Second Amendment right). 
 52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952). 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 54. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment protects 
the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined 
than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”). 
 55. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“The principles laid down in this 
opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the 
concrete form of the case then before the court.”). 
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noted that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run “almost into each 
other”56 and that the protections “apply to all invasions . . . of the 
sanctity of a man’s home and privacies of life”57 when “[b]reaking into 
a house . . . .”58 But when arriving at the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, no such protections to or within the home exist. 
In Kelo v. New London, the Court found that the seizure of homes 
for economic development purposes was justifiable.59 Unlike the Third 
and Fourth Amendments, the Fifth Amendment does not textually 
impose any special protections on homes. But like the First and Second 
Amendments and the criminal procedure clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Takings Clause does not doctrinally provide for a 
special protection to the home. However, a close reading of Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Kelo raises the prospect that the Court could, in 
limited circumstances, provide for special protections to homes in 
takings.60 
There, Justice Thomas noted that the Court has “elsewhere [in the 
Fourth Amendment] recognized ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity 
of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins 
of the Republic.’”61 He implicitly referenced the special protections to 
the home as a zone of privacy in the First, Second and Fourth 
Amendments by noting that “[t]hough citizens are safe from the 
government in their homes, the homes themselves [in takings] are 
not.”62 He then focused his argument for a lack of homebound 
protection in takings on the Fourth Amendment, explaining that “[w]e 
would not defer to a legislature’s determination of the various 
circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home 
would be reasonable,” because we have recognized the “overriding 
respect for the sanctity of the home.”63 
The Court has failed to embrace Justice Thomas’s plea for a more 
rigorous judicial review of takings where homes are subject to seizure. 
However, as argued in recent scholarship, the logical doctrinal step is 
for the Court to embrace coherence theory as a guiding principle for 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 60. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103 (explaining why the absence of home-centric takings 
protection is notable). 
 61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (emphasis added). 
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invoking a home-centric takings doctrine.64 Doing so would close the 
schism in the special protections to the home.65 This seems logical. 
Scholars and jurists strive for coherence. The practice of achieving 
harmony in text and doctrine requires scholars and jurists to identify 
“patterns of influence and adjustment” and then reason their way to a 
coherent outcome.66 Thus, intratextual and intradoctrinal methods of 
interpretation reveal a pattern of jurisprudential influence by the 
Supreme Court that carves out a variety of interpretive tools to find a 
zone of protections in the home in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendments, except for the Takings Clause. This pattern of 
coherence strongly suggests that the Court could, and arguably should, 
in limited circumstances, achieve coherence in takings by applying 
special protections homes that are subject to expropriation or 
overregulation.67 
 
 64. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103 (“[I]f the Fourth Amendment provides protections 
to homes (albeit within the zone of privacy), then it would seem that, as a matter of consistency 
and symmetry, the Court should likewise extend similar special protections to homes[.]”). 
 65. Id. Writing about this schism: 
Constitutional congruence of home protections offers a comprehensive vision of the 
sanctity of the home in the Bill of Rights that embraces consistency and predictability. 
This constitutional congruence, in other words, offers a pragmatic mode of 
interpretation that harmonizes the home consistently in between and across all five 
amendments, including the Takings Clause. The addition of homebound protections in 
takings would further allow scholars and jurists to contemplate the home not solely 
through the lens of an “individual line of constitutional text” as if bound to, say, the 
Third or Fourth Amendment. Rather, pursuing home protections in the Takings Clause 
harmonizes home-centric doctrines in the Bill of Rights as a whole. This is achieved by 
doing two things at once: inferring the “home’s constitutional primacy from the 
structure and context of the document itself,” and subsequently drawing parallels to the 
sanctity of the home by leaning on precedent and doctrine from other doctrines within 
the Bill of Rights. 
Id. at 1136. 
 66. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1241 (1987). 
 67. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 1103. I have proposed a homebound takings doctrine that 
would include special protection tests and doctrines to homes under the Nollan and Dolan means-
end tests in the public use context, the Penn Central burden per se burden shifting test, the Lucas 
categorical test and Loretto’s temporary physical invasion tests. For example, in an eminent 
domain proceeding where a home is subject to condemnation, the Court could theoretically 
employ the Nollan and Dolan exactions heightened scrutiny tests to technically require the 
condemning municipality to rationally relate the means by which the government acquires 
property to the specific public purpose where homes are threatened by condemnation. In other 
words, the proof standard would require the government to demonstrate a connection between 
the taking of a home and the specific public purpose for the taking. Likewise, a homebound 
protection under the Court’s takings doctrine would specially protect homes if a regulation 
affected the economic value of the home. For example, special just compensation formulas, or 
above fair market values, would be granted to homeowners whose property is impacted. Under 
the Court’s Lucas test, a homebound doctrine might invalidate a regulation if it reduced the 
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III. METHODOLOGICAL & DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A 
COHERENT HOMEBOUND BILL OF RIGHTS 
A harmonized, home-centric Bill of Rights reveals profound 
interdependence and relational connections within and across 
homebound doctrines in ways scholars have not addressed by 
employing intratextual and intradoctrinal modes of interpretation. To 
read the Court’s homebound doctrines as just one “individual line of 
constitutional text” within each amendment68 distracts jurists and 
scholars from the normative prescriptions that the home could, and 
arguably should, be granted greater protections across the Bill of 
Rights as a whole, including the Takings Clause.69 
Bridging various home-centric amendments “can help identify 
additional aspects of holistic constitutional reasonableness,” such as 
property protections.70 These interpretive combinations are useful for 
deeper understandings of the utility of home-protection doctrines 
across the Bill of Rights, because “[s]ometimes the home’s 
constitutional preeminence is express” while at other times the Court 
has “inferred the home’s constitutional primacy from the structure and 
context of the document itself.”71 When we juxtapose the various 
protections to homes in adjoining and non–adjoining clauses, we find 
potentially new doctrines to provide greater protections to homes that 
were previously unaddressed. 
A. Smut, Guns and Searches 
Juxtaposing the adjoining and non–adjoining First, Second, and 
Fourth Amendment doctrines involving smut, guns, and searches brings 
a fresh perspective to the atextual nature of the Court’s homebound 
doctrine. 
 
market value of the home by some specified percentage, as opposed to Lucas’s test of “all 
economically viable use.” If the regulation deprived the homeowner of even less than all 
economically viable use of the property, the regulations would either be struck down or the 
homeowner would be entitled to specially calculated just compensation. Lastly, a homebound 
protection under the Fifth Amendment might employ the Loretto test if the “character of the 
governmental action” is a temporary instead of a permanent physical occupation or invasion of 
the home. 
 68. Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1305 (2009). 
 69. Michal C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 232 (2008). 
 70. AMAR, supra note 6, at 79. 
 71. Miller, supra note 68, at 1304.  
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Recall Stanley v. Georgia. Some members of the Court focused their 
review of the underlying action on its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, yet Stanley was a case that dealt strictly with lewd 
material in the home. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart honed in on 
the Fourth Amendment—rather than the First—as the primary 
constitutional inquiry before the Court, noting that the presence of the 
agents in the “house” with warrants made the search and seizure valid, 
but did not permit the agents to seize the obscene material.72 The Court 
was able depart doctrinally from its earlier rulings finding obscenity 
unprotected under the First Amendment by making the distinction that 
the prior rulings dealt with obscenity in public, whereas the locus at 
issue in Stanley was a private home.73 Perhaps the Court in Stanley was 
“influenced by an appreciation of our society’s traditional connection 
between one’s home and one’s sense of autonomy and personhood.”74 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller, on the other hand, makes a non–
adjoining intradoctrinal connection as opposed to intratextual one, by 
tracking the First and Fourth Amendments in justifying the Court’s 
position on bearing arms in the home. He stated that like the First and 
Fourth Amendments—each of which respectively protect modern 
forms of communications and searches—the Second extends to all 
instruments that constitute “bearable arms, even those that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding.”75 Justice Scalia further 
illustrated the connection between the First and Second Amendment, 
arguing that “just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect 
the right of citizens to speak for any purpose,” the Court does not read 
the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to “carry arms 
for any sort of confrontation.”76 Then, to add the Fourth Amendment 
to the mix and draw an extended link between constitutional 
amendments, Justice Scalia stated that the First and Second (and Third) 
Amendments “codified a pre–existing right.”77 
It is clear that Justice Scalia—inadvertently perhaps—extended the 
Court’s obsession with protections to the “home” to the Second 
Amendment by relying upon the First and Fourth Amendments 
 
 72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) 
 73. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (finding obscenity “not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech”). 
 74. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 57 (1993). 
 75. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
 76. Id. at 595. 
 77. Id. at 591. 
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protections. For an originalist (arguably textualist78) such as Scalia, it 
seems that “even the best documentarian reading must sometimes 
yield in court to brute facts born of earlier judicial and political 
deviations.”79 When homes are at the center of a constitutional dispute, 
textualists simply may be “ill-equipped to be good documentarians.”80 
Perhaps this is a good thing, but as Amar has argued, the law might also 
be worse off if all the Justices engaged in pure textualism.81 
Putting aside the Fourth Amendment for a moment, it does seem 
that the Second Amendment is the “equivalent of our coming to know 
the First Amendment.”82 But this raises a few problems doctrinally. 
Justice Scalia did not seem to recognize that if obscenity is protected 
inside the home, but not outside the home, then why should the right 
to bear arms outside the home have greater protections? It is arguably 
the case that the Heller Court “sent unmistakable signals that the First 
and Second Amendments are cousins and may be subject to similar 
limitations.”83 
Indeed, “[o]utside the home, the undirected, unauthorized bearing 
of firearms by individuals simply is not the bearing of arms in the 
Second Amendment sense, any more than obscenity outside the home 
is speech in the First Amendment sense.”84 Juxtaposing these two 
amendments in light of Justice Scalia’s doctrinal somersaults shows the 
difficulty of interpreting adjoining amendments within the Bill of 
Rights regarding homes. Similar to obscenity, “it is the home that 
mediates not only the constitutional purpose, but the constitutional 
meaning of these textual provisions.”85 Sometimes the Court must go 
beyond identifying meaning and instead engage in implementation of 
the Second Amendment by crafting doctrine that is driven by the 
Constitution but is not directly reflective of its meaning. As Miller 
notes, this is exactly what Justice Scalia achieved in reading into the 
Second Amendment jurisprudence a right to bear arms in “hearth and 
 
 78. Michael P. Healy, The Claims and Limits of Justice Scalia’s Textualism: Lessons from his 
Statutory Standing Decisions, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2861, 2867 (2019) (“Beginning in the 1980s, 
Justice Scalia emerged as the leading advocate of the textualist approach to the interpretation of 
statutes.”). 
 79. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 28. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to 
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (1991). 
 83. Miller, supra note 68, at 1304.  
 84. Id. at 1320–21. 
 85. Id. at 1321. 
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home.”86 Indeed, as Miller says, a “person who feels truly at liberty from 
government or private threats only when he strolls about the streets 
with bandoliers and a machine gun . . . is much like the person who feels 
truly at liberty only when he scans obscene magazines on a public park 
bench.”87 This, as Miller explains, is not constitutionally-protected 
activity. 
Inserting the Court’s smut doctrine into the Court’s gun doctrine 
would seem to be simple, because the latter right, like the former, is a 
right that, in some instances, “ends at the doorstep.”88 If the 
government, by way of the First Amendment, “can regulate obscenity” 
in public spaces to “protect the health and welfare of the populace” 
then arguably, as Miller notes, the government should be able to do the 
same with firearms.89 Doing so views the regulation of firearms in 
public no different than the regulation of lewd material in public.90 
Smut, guns, and searches, when commingled and cross-pollinated, show 
how intradoctrinalism and intratextualism work in tandem to shed light 
on underexplored themes in constitutional law. 
B. Seizing Guns 
The Court’s ruling in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago noted that 
governments must compensate owners when property is taken for a 
public use.91 This rule, embedded in due process doctrine, extends to 
compensating property owners when property is destroyed or reduced 
in value for a public purpose.92 However, as the Court noted in Miller 
v. Schoene, the government may also destroy a class of property for the 
purpose of promoting public values.93 
One obvious parallel in seizures of personal property deemed the 
antithesis of the public good is alcohol. In the Court’s pre-Lochner era 
ruling in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court made a distinction between its 
police power and takings power by permitting the destruction of 
property for a justifiable public good.94 There, the Court drew a fine 
 
 86. Id. at 1351. 
 87. Id. at 1352. 
 88. Id. at 1299. 
 89. Id. at 1300. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
 92. Robert A. O’Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira, An Uncertain Right: The Second Amendment 
and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 179, 200 (1992). 
 93. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (emphasis added). 
 94. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). 
DICKINSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  12:02 PM 
306 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15 
parallel between the prohibition era practice of destroying alcohol for 
the public good—an exercise of the police power—and takings. Robert 
A. O’Hare, Jr. and Jorge Pedreira note that if the government exercises 
its police powers to destroy personal property, such as alcohol, then 
such logic may extend to destroying confiscated guns for the public 
benefit or public good of health and safety.95 Indeed, this would extend 
to regulations affecting firearms and physical confiscation of such 
firearms. The argument is buttressed by state legislatures that have 
viewed bans on assault weapons specifically as justifiable under police 
power prerogatives of protecting public safety.96 Private property that 
is deemed a public nuisance, such as guns, could plausibly avoid takings 
scrutiny if the purpose of the state action is to protect the health, safety, 
and general welfare of the public. Indeed, restrictions on manufacture 
and sale of machine guns or temporary suspensions on importing 
assault weapons have not been found to be takings.97 
Likewise, regulations that require peaceable surrender, lawful 
disposition, or lawful removal of a firearm may arguably be a lawful 
exercise of the legislature’s police power instead of eminent domain.98 
In fact, some courts have upheld ordinances that have limited 
geographic reach, in which restrictions were placed on firearms, but 
owners could still sell or dispose of their firearms beyond the municipal 
boundaries, thus negating any taking because the regulation did not 
destroy the use and enjoyment of the firearm completely.99 However, 
that doctrinal calculus may change if the state focused its police power 
 
 95. O’Hare & Pedreira, supra note 92, at 201. 
 96. Id.; see also Hyde v. City of Birmingham, 392 So. 2d 1226 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) 
(forbidding by ordinance public possession of certain weapons under circumstance where natural 
tendency of such possession would be to provoke breach of the peace); Matthews v. State, 148 
N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958) (requiring by statute procurement of a license to carry certain firearms 
except in person’s abode or fixed place of business); People v. McFadden, 188 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 
App. 1971) (requiring by statute license to carry a concealed weapon); State v. Robinson, 343 
P.2d 886 (Or. 1959) (forbidding by statute a person who has been convicted of a felony from 
having in his possession or under his custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed 
upon the person); Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 668 P.2d 596 (Wash. 1983) 
(limiting by ordinance possession of firearms where alcoholic beverages are sold); Carfield v. 
State, 649 P.2d 865 (Wyo. 1982) (forbidding by statute the use or possession of a firearm by one 
who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to certain crime). 
 97. See Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 869 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that temporary 
suspensions are not takings after considering the nature of the regulation and its economic 
impact); Akins v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619, 622 (2008) (holding that the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ designation of, and restrictions on, machine guns were an 
exercise of police power). 
 98. Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 865–66 (D.C. 1979) (upholding a police department’s 
decision to deny registration for guns with particular level of fire power). 
 99. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1184 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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to force the surrender, disposition, or removal of a firearm stored or 
possessed in the home. A home-centric takings doctrine would then 
become relevant. 
The government does, in limited circumstances, seize guns as an 
exercise of its police power for the health, safety, and general welfare 
of the public. Such an ordinance, for example, could ban assault 
weapons in public and in private residences, specifically homes, due to 
the concern that such weapons stored in homes could injure or cause 
death to children, guests, and other family members, or cause abrupt 
disorder. This is precisely what happened in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
There, New Orleans law enforcement officials went to the doors of 
property owners, many of who were homeowners, to force compliance 
with evacuation orders.100 Those orders required law enforcement to, 
among other things, confiscate firearms for the purpose of maintaining 
civility. Public officials cited significant public looting and criminal 
activity in the wake of Katrina as reasons for banning possession of 
firearms. The ordinance authorized law enforcement to confiscate 
firearms with an authorized search warrant. Gun rights advocates 
argued the very opposite, noting that stripping citizens of firearms left 
families at risk of harm, injury, or death at the hands of looters, gangs, 
home invaders, rapists and other criminals.101 
Missing from the debate in the wake of the New Orleans firearm 
ordinance was the Takings Clause. The Heller ruling, handed down soon 
after Hurricane Katrina, established additional protections of firearm 
possession in the “hearth and home.”102 Yet, physical seizure of firearms 
possessed in the homestead, for purposes of keeping public order 
during a natural disaster, may not fall as comfortably within police 
powers of local governments as one would expect in light of a home-
centric Takings Clause.103 
 
 100. Stephen P. Halbrook, “Only Law Enforcement Will Be Allowed to Have Guns”: 
Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearms Confiscations, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 339, 
339–40 (2008) (describing the confiscation order and subsequent litigation by the NRA, written 
by counsel for the NRA in NRA of Am., Inc. v. Nagin, No. 05-4234 J(2), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
275 (E.D. La. 2006)). 
 101. Nagin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 275, at *3–*4 (issuing a consent decree following a 
settlement of the NRA’s suit against the Mayor of New Orleans and the New Orleans 
Superintendent of Police granting a permanent injunction against the seizure of lawfully 
possessed firearms). 
 102. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 103. In Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), the Court of Appeals of 
Indiana held that a firearm seizure and retention statute was rationally calculated to advance the 
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In other words, a homebound takings doctrine places special 
limitations on governments who attempt to condemn personal 
property in firearms for purposes of public safety. Local governments 
could conceivably, in the face of difficult doctrinal hurdles, circumvent 
Second Amendment homebound restrictions on firearms by simply 
physically seizing such personal property as part and parcel of its police 
power. However, a home-centric takings doctrine might impose stricter 
compensation requirements or heightened scrutiny when physically 
taking a home or requiring the surrender and confiscation of weapons 
possessed in the home in a time of emergency. 
C. Firearms, the Police Power and Takings 
The noncontiguous Second and Fifth Amendments raise an 
interesting parallel in doctrine when read from the Court’s line of 
regulatory takings precedent. In fact, some federal courts have 
entertained challenges to gun possession statutes under the Takings 
Clause.104 Recall Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.105 
There, the Court weighed the government’s exercise of its police power 
to enact laws that regulate property, and whether such a regulation, 
which is usually deemed valid and permissible, inhibits property rights 
to the extent that it becomes a taking without regard to the public 
interest.106 In light of the state’s police power, the Court also set forth 
the basis for what eventually become known as the Lucas test, which 
determines if a regulation constitutes a taking by asking whether it 
deprives the property owner of all economically viable use of his 
 
legitimate governmental purpose of prohibiting the mentally ill from possessing firearms. 
Therefore, it seems the statute was a valid exercise of police power and not a violation of the right 
to bear arms. Id. at 836–37. In State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 676 (Ariz. 
2017), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the State may constitutionally prohibit a city’s 
practice, prescribed by local ordinance, of destroying firearms that the city obtains through 
forfeiture or unclaimed property. In doing so, the court explained that “[r]egulation of firearms, 
including their preservation or destruction . . . involves the state’s police power and is of statewide 
concern.” Id. Perhaps impliedly then, if the destruction of firearms is equivalent to the taking of 
firearms, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the taking of firearms, at a minimum, involves 
state’s police power and is of statewide concern. 
 104. See, e.g., Gun S., Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 869 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding law temporarily 
suspending importation of assault weapons not violative of the Takings Clause). The court noted 
that if it had jurisdiction to consider a takings claim, it would analyze a gun regulation under the 
Penn Central per se test to determine the character of the governmental action, its economic 
impact and its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations. 
 105. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that requiring an apartment owner to allow installation of 
a cable box on the building is a taking requiring just compensation). 
 106. Id. at 425. 
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property.107 Or, as set forth in Penn Central, whether the regulation 
imposes substantial economic impact, interferes with investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the action runs afoul of the 
public interest generally.108 Indeed, for example, legislation that 
dispossesses an owner of a gun or capacity magazines, by forcing him 
to surrender the property to law enforcement, is arguably a regulatory 
taking.109 This line of reasoning is what the Court in Horne explained: 
property owners “do not expect their property, real or personal, to be 
actually occupied or taken away.”110 Legislation that requires a gun 
owner to surrender, remove, or sell a firearm and thus deprives the 
owner of possession and use of his property rights is a taking, and the 
states’ police power could not be justified to circumvent the just 
compensation requirement.111 
The Supreme Court’s Murr ruling set forth two scenarios where 
governmental regulation is so burdensome that it constitutes a taking, 
noting that “with certain qualifications . . . a regulation which ‘denies 
all economically beneficial or productive use of land’ will require 
compensation under the Takings Clause.”112 The Court proceeded to 
explain that “when a regulation impedes the use of property without 
depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, a taking still 
may be found based on ‘a complex of factors,’ including (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”113 
Likewise, the Court further extended its logic in Horne, noting that “a 
physical appropriation of property g[ives] rise to a per se taking, 
without regard to other factors.”114 There, the Court found that a 
physical seizure of raisins was cognizable under the Takings Clause.115 
 
 107. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 108. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 (describing the Penn Central test); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127–28 (1978). 
 109. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (enjoining enforcement of a 
California statute that restricted possession of magazines able to hold more than 10 rounds). 
 110. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2015) (finding that a regulation requiring 
raisin growers to reserve a percentage of their raisins for the government, free of charge, and to 
pay a fine for failure to obey was a taking requiring just compensation). 
 111. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1138–39. 
 112. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)). 
 113. Id. at 1943. 
 114. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (2015). 
 115. Id. 
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Indeed, some federal courts have agreed that regulations requiring 
surrender of guns to law enforcement to be destroyed constitutes a 
taking, relying upon the precedential string of regulatory takings cases 
to make the point. In Duncan v. Becerra, the Southern District of 
California enjoined California from requiring persons to dispossess 
themselves of lawfully-owned magazines able to hold more than 10 
rounds.116 Persons could dispossess the magazines by removing them 
from the State, selling them to a licensed firearm dealer, or 
surrendering them to a law enforcement agency for destruction.117 
Plaintiffs brought facial and as-applied challenges to the regulation, 
alleging infringement of their Second Amendment right to bear arms.118 
The government contended that it acted within its police powers for 
public safety purposes, and that “a prohibition on possession of 
property declared to be a public nuisance is not a physical taking.”119 
The District Court recognized that, in accordance with Loretto,120 
“whether a law effects a physical taking is ‘a separate question’ from 
whether the state has the police power to enact the law.”121 And even 
where the regulation “enjoin[s] a property owner from activities akin 
to public nuisances,” scrutiny under the regulatory takings doctrine 
may still be appropriate.122 Indeed, dispossession of guns via surrender 
to the government for destruction constituted, according to the court, 
a per se taking requiring just compensation.123 Further, such 
dispossession via sale was infeasible because the regulation brought the 
fair market value of the magazines “near zero.”124 Likewise, the court 
found removal of guns from the state infeasible because it unfairly 
relied upon other states that permit ownership of large capacity 
magazines, and “the associated costs of removal and storage and 
retrieval may render the process more costly than the fair market 
 
 116. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1139–40 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 32310). 
 117. Id. at 1110. 
 118. Id. at 1112. 
 119. Id. at 1136. The District Court noted that California’s designation of large capacity 
magazines as a public nuisance is “dubious.” Id. at 1137. 
 120. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1982) (“It is a 
separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights 
that compensation must be paid. We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized 
by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.”). 
 121. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425). 
 122. See id. (“[T]he ‘legislature’s recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis 
for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.’” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
 123. Id. at 1138. 
 124. Id. 
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value125 (if there is any) of the magazine itself.” The court, in an apt line, 
noted “whatever might be the State’s authority to ban the sale or use 
of magazines over 10 rounds, the Takings Clause prevents it from 
compelling the physical dispossession of such lawfully-acquired private 
property without just compensation.”126 
A home-centric takings doctrine that tightens the Loretto test, for 
example, to include any temporary invasion or occupation of the home, 
may extend to regulations that “temporarily” suspend or invade gun 
possession in the home. Further, a stricter Lucas test that permits 
challenges to gun regulations that deprive a gun owner of less than all 
economically viable use of the firearm in the home is an interesting 
parallel worth noting. 
However, under the prevailing home-less takings doctrine, 
temporary gun suspensions in the home or elsewhere may not rise to a 
regulatory taking. In Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, the government argued, 
among other things, that a gun manufacturer could not “establish a 
valid taking claim because . . . the Government’s temporary deprivation 
of the rifles does not constitute a compensable taking.”127 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the takings claim, 
but the court nonetheless entertained how such a claim might result. It 
noted “that the temporary suspension does not constitute a taking” 
because the state “acted in a purely regulatory capacity and does not 
profit from its actions.”128 The court further noted that the state action 
“neither permanently nor totally deprived [Gun South] of any property 
because the Government . . . only temporarily suspended the 
importation of such rifles” and that although the gun manufacturer may 
have had a “reasonable investment-backed expectation, [Gun South 
did] not demonstrate that the suspension will unreasonably impair the 
value of the rifles.”129 Consequently, “no compensable taking . . . 
occurred.”130 
 
 125. Id. at 1138. The District Court noted that the “typical retail cost of a magazine” is 
between $20 and $50. Id. 
 126. Id. The District Court concluded that the regulation would deprive Plaintiffs “not just of 
the use of their property, but of possession” as well. Id. (emphasis in original). “Without 
compensation, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed as they will no longer be able to retrieve or 
replace their ‘large’ capacity magazines.” Id. Accordingly, the court granted the preliminary 
injunction “to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable injury under the Takings Clause.” 
Id. at 1139 (emphasis in original). 
 127. 877 F.2d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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D. Firearms, Exactions and Permits 
In a similar vein, the Court’s exactions doctrine, which requires the 
state to satisfy criteria for bargains that implicate the use of land,131 
could conceivably be applied in the Second Amendment context with 
caution. Conditioning a permit to use property in a certain manner on 
the requirement that a property owner relinquish a constitutional right 
is a quintessential example of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.132 Recall Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.133 There, 
the Court determined that an unlawful exaction had been exercised 
when the government demanded the landowner convey an easement 
across his land for a beachfront view to the public in exchange for a 
building permit.134 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, likewise, withholding a 
building permit on a condition that has no essential nexus or rough 
proportionality to the public harm was an exaction in violation of the 
Takings Clause.135 In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District, the Court found that denying a development permit based on 
a landowner’s refusal to accede to a wetland improvement condition 
was a taking and that demanding a monetary fee in exchange for the 
permit also ran afoul of the Takings Clause.136 
Now, recall Heller.137 There, the D.C. ordinance banned handgun 
possession of unregistered firearms and required residents keep 
lawfully owned guns unloaded or bound by a trigger lock in the home. 
Dick Heller’s registration application was denied because he wished to 
possess his handgun in his home for protection.138 The Court found that 
mandating nonfunctional firearms in the home was a total ban on 
handguns in violation of the Second Amendment’s individual right to 
bear arms.139 However, to read the Court’s exaction branch of its 
 
 131. Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 287, 
288. 
 132. Sullivan, supra note 39, at 1420.  
 133. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 134. Id. at 841–42 (“California is free to advance its ‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by 
using its power of eminent domain . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it 
must pay for it.”). 
 135. 512 U.S. 374, 394–95 (1994) (“We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies 
do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the 
petitioner’s proposed new building.”). 
 136. 570 U.S. 595, 619 (2013) (“[T]he government’s demand for property from a land-use 
permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government 
denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”). 
 137. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 138. See id. at 575–76. 
 139. Id. at 635. 
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regulatory takings doctrine from an intradoctrinal method into the 
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms raises a few intriguing points. 
First, can the government achieve indirectly through the Takings 
Clause what it cannot do directly in the Second Amendment? Could 
the government circumvent the Second Amendment’s strict scrutiny 
standard by requiring the applicant to agree to dissemble or lock his 
handgun in the home in exchange for the firearm permit? Such an ad 
hoc exercise of the government’s police power may give rise to a 
takings claim, but it arguably would survive the Court’s heightened 
standard of review in exactions. Let us assume that there is an 
individual right, as opposed to collective right, to bear arms and that 
such a right may be realized through a lawful registration and 
permitting process. Heller tells us that a total ban on functioning 
firearms in the home runs afoul of the Second Amendment. Further, let 
us assume that a person has a property interest in a handgun and 
firearm permit, because a firearm, in and of itself, is personal property, 
like a vehicle, triggering protections under the Takings Clauses.140 If the 
government cannot totally ban operable firearms from a person’s 
home, then the government could, arguably, be capable of achieving 
that same result by demanding the owner forfeit his operable firearm 
in the home in exchange for a non-operable firearm permit. 
As Justice Breyer’s dissent explains, the D.C. ordinance was enacted 
in part on the basis that gun-related accidents required government 
regulation for purposes of public safety.141 The public harm, then, is 
injury and death caused by unlocked and assembled firearms inside and 
outside the home. The condition may meet the essential nexus test, 
which requires a direct connection between the legitimate state interest 
in saving lives and mitigating gun-related injuries and the permit 
condition of requiring the applicant to agree to trigger-lock or 
disassemble the firearm in the home.142 Further, such ad hoc conditions 
may meet the rough proportionality test, which inquires whether the 
gun restriction by a city ordinance, like the one in Heller, bears a 
reasonable relationship to the projected impact of unlocked triggers 
and assembled firearms in the home.143 
 
 140. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2421–22 (2015). 
 141. Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 142. See id. (“The law at issue here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, bears 
a ‘rational relationship’ to that ‘legitimate’ life-saving objective.”). 
 143. See id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny 
to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests 
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns 
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But these arguments also weaken the home-centric protections 
generally sought by the Court. On the contrary, reading exactions 
doctrine into the Second Amendment may provide greater protections 
from legislation impinging on the right to bear arms in the home. It is 
equally plausible that the essential nexus and rough proportionality 
tests fail when the government seeks to condition gun permits on the 
owner relinquishing his right to have an operable firearm in the home, 
because courts may find the health and safety concerns involving self-
defense in the home are not roughly proportional to perceived harm to 
children, other family members or guests in the home. 
E. Soldiers, Searches and Self-Incrimination 
Drawing upon intratextual and intradoctrinal methods of 
protections regarding soldiers and searches shows the Court’s 
cleverness with doctrinalism when the home and privacy are 
intertwined. Few provisions and amendments that adjoin each other 
have the same or similar wording. But the Third and Fourth 
Amendments are the Constitution’s textual “home” for protections to 
homes, and, arguably, are the root of the homebound tree that has 
grown into the First, Second, and Fifth Amendments. The Third 
Amendment permits the forced quartering of soldiers, presumably by 
an act of Congress, in houses during wartime, but not during 
peacetime.144 The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, states the 
“right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses,” meaning perhaps 
the Third Amendment is really about property, rather than people.145 
This important connection shows that both amendments “explicitly 
protect ‘houses’ from needless and dangerous intrusions by 
governmental officials.”146 
As some argue, “[w]ith the help of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Third Amendment [] constitutionalized the maxim, ‘every man’s home 
is his castle[]’” and that liberty and privacy protections in the Third 
“have justified the application of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”147 But the text of both 
 
on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the 
former in the course of advancing the latter.” (emphasis in original)). 
 144. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 145. Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Military 
Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 113, 132–33 (2005). 
 146. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1175 (1991). 
 147. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 967 (2d Cir. 1982) (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
DICKINSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  12:02 PM 
2020] INTRATEXTUAL AND INTRADOCTRINAL DIMENSIONS 315 
amendments could be read differently. For example, the Third 
Amendment is arguably concerned with property protections rather 
than privacy, as the text expressly states soldiers may not be “quartered 
in any house,” whereas the Fourth Amendment protects the “right of 
the people to be secure in their . . . houses.”148 
Recall Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court’s major ruling on 
obscenity and Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.149 There, 
officers found paraphernalia hidden in the home, and without a 
warrant, the Court ruled that such a search and seizure of items not 
initially part of the investigation was unconstitutional.150 But Justice 
Clark’s opinion offers more than just a lesson on criminal procedure 
under the Fourth Amendment. He offers a clue into what the Court 
makes of the “home” across several amendments. 
There, he explained that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run 
“almost into each other” and that the Court’s doctrine in both 
amendments “applies to all invasions on the part of the government 
and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.”151 He further explained that “[i]t is not the breaking of his doors, 
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property[.]”152 Here, Justice Clark 
commingles the Fifth Amendment’s protection from self-incrimination 
in the “home” with the Fourth Amendment’s protection from 
warrantless searches and seizures in the “home.” The link drawn by 
Justice Clark offers a window for which we can have greater 
appreciation for how homebound doctrines across and within the Bill 
of Rights seamlessly influence each other, and how the Court has often 
leaned into a particular home-centric doctrine to make sense of an 
adjacent or nonadjacent amendment. 
Likewise, Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut is a 
nod to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment’s protections of 
homes.153 That case, of course, dealt with the Court’s reading of an anti-
contraception statute as a violation of a person’s right to marital 
 
 148. Wyatt, supra note 145, at 132 (internal quotations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
III, IV. 
 149. 367 U.S. 643 (1965). 
 150. See id. at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 151. Id. at 646 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 152. Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). 
 153. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
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privacy and the broader privacy right involving intimate practices.154 
The Court in Griswold built upon prior privacy cases to establish a 
general right to protection from government intrusion into private 
spaces, such as the home.155 Justice Douglas quotes “houses” in both 
the Third and Fourth Amendment, but failed to explain how the 
sanctity of the home could be used to “signal the special sanctity of 
bedrooms.”156 
But the Court did not stop at the adjoining nature of the house in 
the Third and Fourth Amendments. Justice Douglas also drew upon the 
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to explain the 
majority’s decision, asking: “[w]ould we allow the police to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives?”157 By linking the “houses” in the Third and Fourth, 
Douglas made the intradoctrinal leap by pulling from the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause to solidify his argument for 
privacy protections in a bedroom regarding conception. Indeed, 
Douglas utilized the penumbra of homebound “emanations” in other 
amendments to strengthen the majority’s reliance upon an 
unenumerated justification to strike down the Connecticut statute. 
F. Soldiers and Takings 
Juxtaposing the nonadjoining Third and Fifth Amendments 
presents a unique thematic association between two provisions that 
directly involve property. There are “few scholars [who] have noted the 
similarities between” these amendments.158 Textually, the Third and the 
Fifth Amendment could plausibly be read into each other, as the Third 
may be the “first cousin to the Fifth.”159 But the Third Amendment’s 
“absence from the Takings Clause debate is striking.”160 Both 
amendments tend to break down along property and liability rules.161 
 
 154. Id. at 485. 
 155. See id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions 
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). 
 156. See Akhil Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1774 (2011). 
 157. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 
 158. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis 
of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1161 n.58 (2005). 
 159. Thomas G. Sprankling, Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of 
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 131 n.120 (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 208 F.R.D. 148, 151–52 (W.D. Tex. 2001)). 
 160. Id. at 122. 
 161. Kontorovich, supra note 158, at 1162. 
DICKINSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  12:02 PM 
2020] INTRATEXTUAL AND INTRADOCTRINAL DIMENSIONS 317 
The Fifth prohibits taking private property unless for public use (a 
property rule) and requires just compensation (a liability rule).162 The 
Third, on the other hand, prohibits quartering soldiers in a person’s 
home (a property rule) during peacetime (a liability rule).163 Thus, it is 
plausible to read the protections afforded under the Third into the 
Fifth. 
 From a historical perspective, the Third Amendment was arguably 
focused on quelling military oppression, which can be interpreted to 
mean that the “home deserved special protection from government 
intrusion” and that, likewise, it is “possible that the Framers intended 
[the Takings Clause]” to provide greater protection to the home than 
other types of property.164 In other words, one might stretch the text of 
both the Third and Fifth Amendments, especially the Takings Clause 
protection of “private property,” to “implicitly” mean protections to 
the home.165 This is plausible. Read together, the Third and Fifth 
(especially a homebound Takings Clause) might offer special 
protections to homes given the continued constitutional “solicitude for 
the home.”166 But without a homebound limitation in the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence, it is plausible that the military could, if it wanted, 
circumvent the peacetime protections in the Third Amendment by 
condemning homes to quarter officers and paying just compensation.167 
But if a homebound limitation were acknowledged in takings, then such 
maneuvering would be more difficult. And what about the physical 
occupation of soldiers in homes during peacetime or wartime? 
Recall Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.168 There, the 
Court set forth its per se takings test involving physical occupations of 
private property. The intruder, of course, was not a soldier seeking 
refuge during peacetime. Instead, it was a cable company authorized by 
statute to affix cable boxes to walls.169 In light of Loretto, which for 
many was an unsatisfactory ruling that left gaps in logic (what about 
mailboxes or water meters?), does quartering soldiers qualify as a 
taking, and if so, is it merely a partial taking? The Court’s takings 
 
 162. Id. at 1161. 
 163. Id. at 1164. 
 164. Sprankling, supra note 159, at 131. 
 165. Id. at 132. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. J. 117, 146–47 (1993). 
 168. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that requiring an apartment owner to allow installation of 
a cable box on the building is a taking requiring just compensation). 
 169. Id. at 421. 
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jurisprudence leaves the door open to the argument that quartering 
soldiers, even temporarily, may be an unlawful intrusion requiring 
compensation under the Third, if not simultaneously the Fifth.170 The 
question, of course, is whether the soldiers are temporarily or 
permanently “affixed” to the home. It is unclear whether that matters, 
as any invasion into the home, regardless of time horizons, arguably 
requires a remedy for the physical imposition. 
Indeed, quartering may qualify as a taking requiring just 
compensation.171 For example, quartering soldiers in a person’s home 
is a “specific type of partial taking” because the “owner’s occupancy of 
the property is limited and its value reduce[d]” while at the same time 
the owner retains fee simple ownership and still, to some degree, 
benefits from the property and will, at some point, take back full 
possession.172 This, one may argue, would be a quintessential regulatory 
taking not requiring just compensation.173 The result might be that the 
Third Amendment “provides [the] benchmark for regulatory takings” 
where claims of takings must give rise to a “much more severe 
deprivation” of private property than the quartering of troops.174 
 If the Third Amendment, under this conception, were to morph into 
a secondary takings clause of sorts, then it seems to elevate the 
quartering of soldiers as a “special class of taking” that requires a 
homeowners’ consent.175 Such consent gives homeowners a heightened 
sense of property interest because they can protect the home and 
personal possessions more than other types of property.176 In other 
words, the Third Amendment arguably presents a special property 
interest in the home because the provision “gives the owner of any 
‘house’ (and presumably not nonresidential property) the right to 
refuse to quarter soldiers during peacetime.”177 However, the Takings 
Clause, regardless of a focus on home protections, would restrict the 
military by prohibiting the institution from denying or disparaging “a 
homeowner’s right to receive just compensation for a public taking.”178 
 
 170. Bell, supra note 167, at 146–47 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). 
 171. Id. at 148. 
 172. See Kontorovich, supra note 158, at 1168 (“The Supreme Court has described similar 
governmental action as a regulatory taking that does not require compensation.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Bell, supra note 167, at 147. 
 176. William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation: Lessons from the 
Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 n.8 (1996). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Bell, supra note 167, at 148. 
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G. Searches and Physical Occupations 
Scholars note that the “[t]he most sacred of all areas . . . is the home” 
under the Fourth Amendment”179 and that such a locus is the “gold 
standard” for Fourth Amendment protections.180 Such protections 
extend beyond the typical owner-occupied “houses” to residential 
dwellings broadly, including temporary dwellings, hotels, boarding 
places, and long-term hospital rooms.181 Linda McClain explains: 
“jurists often use [the] maxim[s] [of ‘castle’ and ‘fortress’] to explain 
the political and historical significance of the Fourth Amendment, 
which purposely focuses protections on the ‘inviolability of the inside’” 
of the locus.182 And though the privacy concerns embedded in the 
Court’s home-centric Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are legion, 
there also persists a property-centric conception of the Fourth 
Amendment.183 As Orin Kerr explains, though the text of the 
Amendment states “reasonable expectation of privacy,” that 
expectation is realized by the right to exclude, which permits the owner 
to retreat into his own home for safety and security from government 
intrusion.184 
The rights entrenched under the Fourth Amendment also tend to 
“track the right to exclude others” by first having rights of occupation, 
ownership, leasehold interests, or other tenancy rights that give rise to 
a legal right to exclude.185 As Stephanie Stern explains, the “home 
protection is not absolute and there are chinks in the doctrinal armor” 
that reveal a “double-edged sword of housing exceptionalism’s 
property” focus, including lesser privacy protections in trespass or 
squatting cases, protective sweeps after arrest, or the plain-view seizure 
doctrine giving law enforcement power to seize evidence observed 
 
 179. Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the 
Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997). 
 180. Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and 
Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV 1, 7–8 (2009). 
 181. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL. L. REV. 905, 913 n.31 (2010); see also United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 
673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 182. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 202 (1995). 
 183. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–19 (2004) (“[A] strong and 
underappreciated connection exists between the modern Fourth Amendment and real property 
law.”). 
 184. Id. at 809–10. 
 185. Id. at 811. 
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outside the home.186 But as Stern recognizes, even in light of these 
chinks, the home still receives stronger protections under the Fourth 
than other property interests, such as commercial buildings, 
automobiles, and public spaces and places, giving rise to a “bizarre” 
pattern of privacy protection exceptions that, in some circumstances, 
require probable cause for searches of curtilage but reasonable 
suspicion for strip searches in schools.187 It is clear that though the 
Fourth Amendment protects the house in some way, shape or form, the 
Court’s jurisprudence is mainly focused on the privacy protections of a 
person to be secure in the home from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.188 
Yet, with the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause adjoined, one can find useful interconnections between 
the two provisions. For example, Amar writes that the Court could 
plausibly “use the Fourth Amendment to craft special rules when the 
government tries to ‘seize’ a ‘house.’”189 Such protections run the other 
way. The Court’s takings jurisprudence, especially regulatory takings, 
could be utilized to offer greater protections and remedies to unlawful 
and even lawful searches and seizures. 
To force a person to submit to some physical occupation of his land 
is conceivably the same as forcing onto a person’s home and residence 
the entrance of government agents for purposes of search and 
seizure.190 The difference is that though homeowners are compensated 
for the forcible taking, they “are not compensated for the government’s 
use of the physical space of the home” during a search.191 As a result, a 
unique takings claim is plausible where the Court employs its takings 
analysis in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides for a 
“compensable intrusion.”192 
This argument, however, runs into some doctrinal difficulty in light 
of the Court’s Katz decision holding that the Fourth Amendment is 
about privacy rights and its protections do not attach to “places,” but 
rather “people.”193 Privacy conceptions of unenumerated rights is 
simply insufficient, especially because the Fourth Amendment 
 
 186. Stern, supra note 181, at 917–18. 
 187. Id. at 918.  
 188. See Amar, supra note 156, at 1771; see also Sprankling, supra note 159, at 123 n.68. 
 189. See Amar, supra note 156, at 1777.  
 190. See Kelly, supra note 180, at 6–7.  
 191. Id. at 1. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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protections were once focused on places, not people.194 The Court’s 
post-Katz search and seizure doctrine still entails elements focused on 
property protections. It is arguably a flawed doctrine because it focuses 
too much on the residential property, specifically the home.195 Still, 
“while the Fourth Amendment turns a blind eye to the costs incurred 
by legitimate searches, the care for individuals’ property embodied in 
the Takings Clause helps to illustrate” why the blindness may be 
unjust.196 Whether homeowners “should be compensated regardless of 
whether the search was warranted or reasonable” under the Takings 
Clause is a question that a court might entertain.197 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article engaged with textual and doctrinal facets of 
homebound protections in the Bill of Rights. Coherence theory adds a 
dimension to the Supreme Court’s Bill of Rights doctrine. That is, the 
Court could entertain a homebound doctrinal and textual thread of 
protections across the Bill of Rights that would extend from smut to 
takings. What we find by exercising this hybrid interpretive 
methodology combining both intratextualism and intradoctrinalism is 
clarity, coherence, and consistency when the Takings Clause is viewed 
in a similar home-centric vein as its adjoining and non-adjoining 
amendments in the Bill of Rights. This methodological exercise also 
reveals intriguing patterns of related protections between different 
homebound Bill of Rights protections to the home, while at the same 
time exposing deeper thematic associations of protections to the home 
within and across the Bill of Rights and providing normative ways to 
expand protections to the home. 
 
 
 194. Stern, supra note 181, at 907; see also Kerr, supra note 183, at 809–27.  
 195. Stern, supra note 181, at 907.  
 196. Kelly, supra note 180, at 3. 
 197. Id.  
